Impact
The Postgres Trigger node interpolated user-supplied identifier parameters (channel, function, and trigger names) into SQL statements without proper escaping, so an authenticated user could inject arbitrary SQL executed against the connected PostgreSQL database with the configured credential's privileges.
Successful exploitation allows full read and write access to the connected PostgreSQL database.
Patches
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.67, 2.31.5 and 2.32.1. Users should upgrade to these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:
- Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only.
- Disable the PostgresTrigger node by adding
n8n-nodes-base.postgresTrigger to the NODES_EXCLUDE environment variable.
- Ensure PostgreSQL credentials used with n8n are configured with the minimum required privileges and do not use SUPERUSER roles.
These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
References
Impact
The Postgres Trigger node interpolated user-supplied identifier parameters (channel, function, and trigger names) into SQL statements without proper escaping, so an authenticated user could inject arbitrary SQL executed against the connected PostgreSQL database with the configured credential's privileges.
Successful exploitation allows full read and write access to the connected PostgreSQL database.
Patches
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.67, 2.31.5 and 2.32.1. Users should upgrade to these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:
n8n-nodes-base.postgresTriggerto theNODES_EXCLUDEenvironment variable.These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
References