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Gitea: Private Repository Metadata Remains Accessible After Access Revocation

Low severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jul 13, 2026 in go-gitea/gitea • Updated Jul 21, 2026

Package

gomod code.gitea.io/gitea (Go)

Affected versions

< 1.27.0

Patched versions

1.27.0

Description

Summary

A user who previously had access to a private repository can continue to obtain repository metadata through GET /api/v1/user/starred after their access to the repository has been revoked.

After a collaborator is removed from a private repository, direct access to the repository is correctly denied. However, the repository may still appear in the user's starred repository list, and the endpoint continues to return repository metadata. Changes made to that metadata after access revocation are also reflected in subsequent responses.

Details

The issue affects the authenticated endpoint:

GET /api/v1/user/starred

The same behavior was also observed on:

GET /api/v1/user/subscriptions

A reproducible scenario is:

  1. User alice creates a private repository.
  2. User bob is granted collaborator access.
  3. bob stars the repository.
  4. alice removes bob from the repository collaborators.
  5. Direct repository access by bob is denied.
  6. bob requests /api/v1/user/starred.
  7. The repository is still present in the response together with repository metadata.

Additionally, if repository metadata is modified after access revocation, the updated values are returned by /api/v1/user/starred.

As a result, a user who no longer has permission to access the repository can continue to obtain repository metadata through the starred repository list.

PoC

PoC Link

https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Gitea_PoC-EC93/5_poc_starred_list

PoC Details

  1. Create a private repository:
alice/P
description = "INITIAL"

  1. Add bob as a collaborator with read access.

  2. As bob, star the repository:

PUT /api/v1/user/starred/alice/P

Response:

204 No Content

  1. Remove bob from the collaborator list.

  2. Update the repository description:

description = "AFTER-REVOKE"
  1. Verify that direct repository access is no longer allowed:
GET /api/v1/repos/alice/P

Response:

404 Not Found
  1. As bob, request the starred repository list:
GET /api/v1/user/starred

The response still contains the repository entry and reflects the updated description:

{
  "full_name": "alice/P",
  "description": "AFTER-REVOKE",
  "private": true
}

This demonstrates that repository metadata remains accessible through the starred repository list even after repository access has been revoked.

Impact

A user who previously had legitimate access to a private repository can continue to retrieve repository metadata after losing access to the repository.

The exposed information includes repository metadata returned by the endpoint, such as:

  • Repository name (full_name)
  • Repository description
  • Repository visibility status (private)

This issue does not expose repository contents, source code, issues, pull requests, secrets, or collaborator information.

The impact is limited to continued access to repository metadata after repository permissions have been revoked.

References

@bircni bircni published to go-gitea/gitea Jul 13, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Jul 21, 2026
Reviewed Jul 21, 2026
Last updated Jul 21, 2026

Severity

Low

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements Present
Privileges Required Low
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality Low
Integrity None
Availability None
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS score

Weaknesses

Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. Learn more on MITRE.

Missing Authorization

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-58434

GHSA ID

GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q

Source code

Credits

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