|
| 1 | +# Zero-Trust Architecture in AgentMesh |
| 2 | + |
| 3 | +AgentMesh implements zero-trust principles for agent-to-agent communication. This document explains how zero-trust works in the context of AI agents. |
| 4 | + |
| 5 | +## What is Zero-Trust? |
| 6 | + |
| 7 | +Zero-trust assumes that **no agent, message, or connection should be implicitly trusted**, regardless of whether it originates from inside or outside the network boundary. Every interaction must be verified. |
| 8 | + |
| 9 | +Traditional security: "Trust but verify" |
| 10 | +Zero-trust security: "**Never trust, always verify**" |
| 11 | + |
| 12 | +## Zero-Trust Principles in AgentMesh |
| 13 | + |
| 14 | +### 1. Verify Explicitly |
| 15 | + |
| 16 | +Every agent must present verifiable credentials for every request. |
| 17 | + |
| 18 | +```python |
| 19 | +# Every message includes cryptographic proof of identity |
| 20 | +message = Message( |
| 21 | + from_agent="did:agentmesh:alice", |
| 22 | + to_agent="did:agentmesh:bob", |
| 23 | + payload={"request": "read_data"}, |
| 24 | + signature=sign(payload, alice_private_key), |
| 25 | + timestamp=datetime.utcnow(), |
| 26 | +) |
| 27 | + |
| 28 | +# Recipient verifies before processing |
| 29 | +if not verify_signature(message.signature, message.from_agent): |
| 30 | + raise TrustViolation("Invalid signature") |
| 31 | +``` |
| 32 | + |
| 33 | +### 2. Use Least-Privilege Access |
| 34 | + |
| 35 | +Agents only have permissions required for their specific task. |
| 36 | + |
| 37 | +```yaml |
| 38 | +# Policy: Agent can only access specific resources |
| 39 | +agent: did:agentmesh:data-reader |
| 40 | +permissions: |
| 41 | + - resource: /data/reports |
| 42 | + actions: [read] |
| 43 | + # Cannot write, cannot access other paths |
| 44 | +``` |
| 45 | + |
| 46 | +### 3. Assume Breach |
| 47 | + |
| 48 | +Design as if attackers are already inside. Limit blast radius. |
| 49 | + |
| 50 | +``` |
| 51 | +┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ |
| 52 | +│ AGENTMESH │ |
| 53 | +│ │ |
| 54 | +│ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ │ |
| 55 | +│ │ Agent A │────►│ Gateway │────►│ Agent B │ │ |
| 56 | +│ └─────────────┘ └─────────────┘ └─────────────┘ │ |
| 57 | +│ │ │ │ │ |
| 58 | +│ ▼ ▼ ▼ │ |
| 59 | +│ ┌─────────┐ ┌─────────┐ ┌─────────┐ │ |
| 60 | +│ │ Audit │ │ Policy │ │ Audit │ │ |
| 61 | +│ │ Log │ │ Check │ │ Log │ │ |
| 62 | +│ └─────────┘ └─────────┘ └─────────┘ │ |
| 63 | +│ │ |
| 64 | +│ Every hop: Verify identity, check policy, log action │ |
| 65 | +└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ |
| 66 | +``` |
| 67 | + |
| 68 | +## Implementation Details |
| 69 | + |
| 70 | +### Decentralized Identity (DID) |
| 71 | + |
| 72 | +Each agent has a unique, cryptographically verifiable identity: |
| 73 | + |
| 74 | +``` |
| 75 | +did:agentmesh:production:finance-bot:v1.2.3 |
| 76 | + ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ |
| 77 | + method network agent-name version |
| 78 | +``` |
| 79 | + |
| 80 | +DIDs are: |
| 81 | +- **Self-sovereign**: Agents control their own identity |
| 82 | +- **Verifiable**: Public keys are resolvable |
| 83 | +- **Portable**: Work across organizations |
| 84 | + |
| 85 | +### Mutual TLS (mTLS) |
| 86 | + |
| 87 | +All agent-to-agent communication uses mutual TLS: |
| 88 | + |
| 89 | +``` |
| 90 | +Agent A AgentMesh Agent B |
| 91 | + │ │ │ |
| 92 | + │── Client Certificate ──►│ │ |
| 93 | + │◄── Server Certificate ──│ │ |
| 94 | + │ │── Client Certificate ──►│ |
| 95 | + │ │◄── Server Certificate ──│ |
| 96 | + │ │ │ |
| 97 | + │◄─────── Encrypted Channel ──────────────────────►│ |
| 98 | +``` |
| 99 | + |
| 100 | +Both parties authenticate to each other. No anonymous connections. |
| 101 | + |
| 102 | +### Trust Scoring |
| 103 | + |
| 104 | +Every agent has a dynamic trust score based on behavior: |
| 105 | + |
| 106 | +```python |
| 107 | +class TrustScore: |
| 108 | + """Trust score calculated from agent behavior.""" |
| 109 | + |
| 110 | + base_score: float = 0.5 # Start neutral |
| 111 | + |
| 112 | + # Factors that increase trust |
| 113 | + successful_interactions: int |
| 114 | + policy_compliance_rate: float |
| 115 | + uptime: timedelta |
| 116 | + |
| 117 | + # Factors that decrease trust |
| 118 | + policy_violations: int |
| 119 | + anomalous_behavior_count: int |
| 120 | + failed_authentications: int |
| 121 | + |
| 122 | + def calculate(self) -> float: |
| 123 | + """Calculate current trust score (0.0 - 1.0).""" |
| 124 | + score = self.base_score |
| 125 | + score += min(0.2, self.successful_interactions * 0.01) |
| 126 | + score += 0.2 * self.policy_compliance_rate |
| 127 | + score -= 0.1 * self.policy_violations |
| 128 | + score -= 0.05 * self.anomalous_behavior_count |
| 129 | + return max(0.0, min(1.0, score)) |
| 130 | +``` |
| 131 | + |
| 132 | +Trust scores affect: |
| 133 | +- Whether requests are allowed |
| 134 | +- Rate limits applied |
| 135 | +- Required approval levels |
| 136 | + |
| 137 | +### Micro-Segmentation |
| 138 | + |
| 139 | +Agents are segmented by function and data sensitivity: |
| 140 | + |
| 141 | +``` |
| 142 | +┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ |
| 143 | +│ PRODUCTION MESH │ |
| 144 | +│ │ |
| 145 | +│ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ │ |
| 146 | +│ │ SEGMENT: │ │ SEGMENT: │ │ SEGMENT: │ │ |
| 147 | +│ │ PUBLIC │ │ INTERNAL │ │ SENSITIVE │ │ |
| 148 | +│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ |
| 149 | +│ │ ┌───────┐ │ │ ┌───────┐ │ │ ┌───────┐ │ │ |
| 150 | +│ │ │Bot A │ │ │ │Bot C │ │ │ │Bot E │ │ │ |
| 151 | +│ │ └───────┘ │ │ └───────┘ │ │ └───────┘ │ │ |
| 152 | +│ │ ┌───────┐ │ │ ┌───────┐ │ │ ┌───────┐ │ │ |
| 153 | +│ │ │Bot B │ │ │ │Bot D │ │ │ │Bot F │ │ │ |
| 154 | +│ │ └───────┘ │ │ └───────┘ │ │ └───────┘ │ │ |
| 155 | +│ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ │ |
| 156 | +│ │ │ │ │ |
| 157 | +│ └──────────────────┼──────────────────┘ │ |
| 158 | +│ │ │ |
| 159 | +│ Policy-controlled cross-segment │ |
| 160 | +│ communication │ |
| 161 | +└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ |
| 162 | +``` |
| 163 | + |
| 164 | +Cross-segment communication requires explicit policy approval. |
| 165 | + |
| 166 | +### Continuous Verification |
| 167 | + |
| 168 | +Trust is not a one-time decision. AgentMesh continuously verifies: |
| 169 | + |
| 170 | +1. **Session tokens** expire and must be refreshed |
| 171 | +2. **Behavior monitoring** detects anomalies in real-time |
| 172 | +3. **Policy re-evaluation** happens on every request |
| 173 | +4. **Credential rotation** ensures compromised keys have limited impact |
| 174 | + |
| 175 | +```python |
| 176 | +# Example: Session-based verification |
| 177 | +session = await mesh.create_session(agent_did, ttl=300) # 5 min TTL |
| 178 | + |
| 179 | +# Every 30 seconds, verify session is still valid |
| 180 | +while session.is_active: |
| 181 | + if not await mesh.verify_session(session): |
| 182 | + raise SessionExpired() |
| 183 | + await asyncio.sleep(30) |
| 184 | +``` |
| 185 | + |
| 186 | +## Comparison with Traditional Security |
| 187 | + |
| 188 | +| Aspect | Traditional | Zero-Trust (AgentMesh) | |
| 189 | +|--------|------------|------------------------| |
| 190 | +| Trust boundary | Network perimeter | Every agent | |
| 191 | +| Authentication | Login once | Every request | |
| 192 | +| Authorization | Role-based | Attribute + context based | |
| 193 | +| Monitoring | Perimeter logs | Full mesh observability | |
| 194 | +| Breach response | Detect at boundary | Contain at point of failure | |
| 195 | + |
| 196 | +## Getting Started |
| 197 | + |
| 198 | +Enable zero-trust features in your AgentMesh configuration: |
| 199 | + |
| 200 | +```yaml |
| 201 | +# agentmesh.yaml |
| 202 | +security: |
| 203 | + zero_trust: |
| 204 | + enabled: true |
| 205 | + |
| 206 | + identity: |
| 207 | + require_did: true |
| 208 | + did_method: "agentmesh" |
| 209 | + |
| 210 | + tls: |
| 211 | + mtls_required: true |
| 212 | + min_tls_version: "1.3" |
| 213 | + |
| 214 | + verification: |
| 215 | + continuous: true |
| 216 | + session_ttl_seconds: 300 |
| 217 | + |
| 218 | + segmentation: |
| 219 | + enabled: true |
| 220 | + default_segment: "internal" |
| 221 | +``` |
| 222 | +
|
| 223 | +## See Also |
| 224 | +
|
| 225 | +- [Identity Management](identity.md) - DID creation and management |
| 226 | +- [Trust Scoring Algorithm](trust-scoring.md) - How trust scores work |
| 227 | +- [Policy Propagation](policy-propagation.md) - Mesh-wide policy enforcement |
| 228 | +- [mTLS Configuration](mtls.md) - Setting up mutual TLS |
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